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Is corporate governance excessively negative and conformist, and insufficiently positive and liberating? It 
may serve to safeguard the interests of remote investors who have limited and prescribed opportunities to 
influence the affairs of companies, but what about more engaged and involved  owners? What is the 
significance and relevance of corporate governance for active investors, family businesses and ambitious 
entrepreneurs who are eager to build enterprises? Is it a constraint or an enabler, an area to be concerned 
about or something to actively embrace? 
 
ORIGINS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Governance issues such as participation and legitimacy have been long discussed in connection with 
Government. Early pressure for action in a company and market context derived from awareness of 
corporate wrong doing in the US (Seligman, 1982) and increased with subsequent governance scandals in 
the UK, US and elsewhere. However, does corporate governance have to be exclusively or predominantly 
protective in order to prevent abuse and the pursuit of self-interest by people in positions of power? Is it 
primarily defensive to guard a vulnerable underbelly of capitalism and ensure compliance with codes and 
rules designed to prevent undesirable conduct? 
 
Alternatively, could corporate governance be a more positive force? If a governance framework is perceived 
conducive of fairness and balance might this build trust and increase the legitimacy of capitalism and 
markets? Could it play a proactive role and contribute to innovation and business development? Could it 
work with the grain of capitalism, be supportive of enterprise and help entrepreneurs to build their 
businesses? Is it relevant to the aspirations and ambitions of those who found businesses and conducive of 
entrepreneurship? 
 
Historically, governance has been associated with politics and the responsible use of power. The concern of 
this paper is specifically with corporate governance. Enterprises of all types and sizes have an impact upon 
our daily lives. The inventiveness of companies will determine our prospects for the future. Many people 
spend much time, including their most creative hours, either working for businesses, interacting with them or 
benefiting from what they do. These companies supply us with incomes and/or goods and services. Taxes on 
the value they produce fund our public services.  
 
Corporate governance is particularly associated with issues concerning listed or quoted companies, where 
there is a relatively clear separation of ownership and control. In many countries effort has also been 
devoted to improving the governance of public bodies, and there are other arenas such as the world of trade 
unions that would benefit from a review of prevailing governance arrangements. However, our focus is to 
explore the applicability of corporate governance principles to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), 
family businesses and social enterprises. Specifically, how applicable and relevant is corporate governance 
to enterprise and entrepreneurship?  
 
THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
 
The roots of the term 'corporate governance' lie in a perceived requirement for greater openness and 
shareholder power (Jacoby, 1973). How should those with the power to influence governance arrangements 
best ensure that enterprises pursue appropriate aims, engage in relevant activities and use capabilities and 
resources effectively and sustainably? How can they prevent or reduce the risk of individuals and cliques in 
positions of power within companies taking advantage of their roles and pursuing their own interests, for 
example by paying themselves excessive remuneration?  
 
Where ownership is widely spread and in the case of listed companies, shareholders may need to wait for 
periodic communications such as an annual report and accounts in order to assess how directors have 
performed. They are dependent upon the judgements of others. The protection of their interests can partly 
depend upon governance arrangements and how they are implemented. However, in the case of many 
private companies and family businesses, the owners or trustees of their interests may be intimately 
involved, perhaps attending board meetings. Can contemporary corporate governance also address their 
distinct requirements, or could it be extended to do so? 
 
Appropriate governance structures can be accompanied by the inappropriate behaviours of directors. Given 
the nature of human beings and the extent of temptation, many investors do not entirely trust corporate 
governance arrangements or the judgements of others. By investing in a diversified portfolio they endeavour 
to spread their risks and avoid excessive exposure to particular boards that may under perform, for example 
by taking mistaken decisions or missing opportunities.  
 
GENERAL OR SITUATION SPECIFIC RESPONSES  
 
 
For many people corporate governance is associated with principles and/or best practices set out in codes of 
practice. Such documents can suggest standards and norms and result in assumptions that deviations from 
them need to be explained and justified if they are not to result in adverse reactions. Might this inhibit 
innovation and diversity to address particular circumstances? In other walks of life a departure from standard 
could indicate a bespoke approach, and that one has gone beyond a norm and taken the time to address the 
requirements of interested parties in a specific situation. Customers often pay a premium for a response that 
meets their individual requirements. 
 
One can understand collective efforts to identify fundamental governance principles (ACCA, 2014; ICAEW, 
2013) such as seeking to prevent an unhealthy concentration of power, but the duties and responsibilities of 
directors are set out in legislation. In many countries Companies Acts are quite specific in terms of what 
directors should and/or should not do. Beyond this while some might benefit from guidance, to what extent 
should corporate governance be standard as opposed to appropriate to the context? Should directors simply 
observe the norm or commit time to assessing options and adopting and explaining the best course of action 
in a particular situation? 
 
The use of standards, norms and common approaches may simplify the work of auditors, analysts and 
regulators. If more boards thought for themselves and adopted bespoke approaches would innovation and 
diversity lead to a loss of influence among such groups? The more extensive and complex rules, regulations, 
codes and standards are, the greater the opportunity for providers of assurance, governance and reporting 
services. Boards might also be more likely to delegate 'compliance' to head office experts rather than 
themselves discuss the issues. Given the governance focus upon preventing a recurrence of past 'scandals', 
should boards do just enough to comply in some areas, while focusing their attention on priority challenges 
and opportunities and remaining alert to new and emerging areas of risk that the governance community has 
yet to address? 
 
RELATING GOVERNANCE TO PARTICULAR CONTEXTS 
 
 
Is there too much prescription and too little guidance? Has corporate governance practice become a 
bureaucratic and legalistic process of compliance with standard and external approaches, codes and models 
that sometimes seem detached from the challenges of business building and satisfying stakeholder 
interests? Some independent directors try to justify their presence at the boardroom table by posing periodic 
questions relating to assurance, compliance, risks, standards and codes. Many boards delegate the 
observance of codes - or doing just enough to justify ticking a box - to a member of the corporate legal or 
company secretarial team. Should other directors do the same, or should they think about better ways of 
governing and how a board might add more value? 
 
In short, should governance practice pay more attention to the particular context? The importance of 
contextual factors has been recognised by those who have attempted to measure the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. For example, Gerard Schnyder (2012) concluded that: “It seems unlikely that ever 
simpler measures for firm-level corporate governance are able to account for the complex and multiple 
interactions that exist between corporate governance mechanisms and between these and environmental 
factors.” The challenge for directors is to respond appropriately. 
 
Why should one assume that similar - let alone the same - corporate governance approaches and models 
should apply to an entrepreneurial start up, a long established family business, a diversified international 
conglomerate, a professional or charitable body, or a Governmental organisation? In all these areas boards 
have been encountered that have endeavoured to adopt a general and standard governance code. Why 
should anyone imagine that a particular governance model would be appropriate at all stages of an 
enterprise's development from start-up and through the introduction of new lines of business, international 
expansion, technological changes, mergers and acquisitions, and competitive challenges, and in changing 
market, regulatory, economic and social contexts? 
 
One frequently encounters directors who are frustrated at being offered basic principles and general 
solutions rather than advice on the best governance arrangements for the situation they are in at their 
company's particular stage of development. Given the basic principles of corporate governance and the 
extreme diversity of organisations, situations and contexts and the fundamental nature of many 
developments, why is there so little variety in governance approaches, models and practices? Why do 
reviews and changes occur so infrequently? Internationally, flexibility is an issue (KPMG and ACCA, 2014) 
and it is of particular concern to entrepreneurs and directors in dynamic situations. Ideally, corporate 
governance should be capable of evolution to meet the changing needs of a growing business and its 
stakeholders as a succession of distinct stages of development occur. 
 
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Governance academics, advisers, consultants, committees, codes and publications abound. Are they adding 
to the well of governance knowledge and competence or just drawing from it? Where is the return in terms of 
either fewer governance issues or innovation, relevance, proportionality, and bespoke responses that are 
easy to implement, and which build director competence and board effectiveness and contribute to 
sustainable business development and the achievement of key corporate and stakeholder objectives? Where 
is the creative exploration of better alternatives as opposed to occasional reviews of our inheritance from 
governance pioneers? 
 
Risk management and governance is becoming increasing complex (Mainelli, 2014). Does contemporary 
corporate governance deter risk taking from the perspective of entrepreneurs? When businesses are 
growing rapidly, should owners respond to governance suggestions with a sense of trepidation? They may 
recognise that greater scale, international operation and new activities and technologies require new 
perspectives and different ways of operating at board level. They may face particular problems such as 
succession when founder directors step back, or how to maintain family control. However, they may also 
worry whether a standard approach is right for their business and if the relatively bureaucratic, more formal 
and complex approaches being advocated and a greater focus upon compliance might reduce healthy 
diversity, stifle creativity and inhibit innovation. 
 
Many owner managers and start-up entrepreneurs are not convinced that the value of appointing additional 
directors and operating more regular board meetings will outweigh the extra costs involved and possible 
constraints that might result (Coulson-Thomas, 2007b). Before considering corporate governance 
arrangements they may first need to be persuaded that more formality, directors and boards would contribute 
positively to the growth and development of their businesses.  
 
Will new procedures suggested by proponents of more formal governance processes be so time consuming 
to implement that those with ideas for better ways of operating may lie low rather than suggest changes? 
Where various business units need to operate differently, will subjecting them to common approaches and 
disciplines act as a straight-jacket? Should different companies – and perhaps business units - within a 
diversified group have their own governance structures and practices, according to what is most appropriate 
for their individual circumstances?  
 
Do we need different approaches in emerging markets (Mishra et al, 2013)? For many growing businesses 
and family companies around the globe, would adoption of the prevailing governance structure with its 
origins in the particular governance problems of listed companies in certain countries damage what is 
different and special about each of them? Would a better option be to address each case on its own merits, 
and build upon what already works and put in place governance arrangements that match the aspirations 
and requirements of each set of stakeholders for the next stage of development of each entity? Should the 
governance community more explicitly recognise the distinct perspectives, interests, aspirations and 
priorities of entrepreneurs? 
 
ASSESSING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Given the profile of corporate governance, should we expect more than just an association between the 
observance of codes and performance? Should we expect a direct cause and effect link and measurable 
benefits? Are there fewer business failures? Is there less favouritism, fraud and corruption? Has director 
remuneration moderated? Are boards taking smarter decisions? Are they better informed, more vital and 
adding more value? Do entrepreneurs ascribe their success to boards and corporate governance 
arrangements? Are the later now more relevant, flexible and conducive of innovation and value creation? Are 
governance danger signals still apparent in boards? 
 
How should one measure governance success? Is it observance of principles, compliance with codes and 
laws, or the degree of challenge and/or the quality of thinking, debate and decisions in the boardroom? 
Should a board assess itself and/or commission an independent evaluation and/or seek the external views of 
investors and other stakeholders? Are there indications of external recognition such as awards? What criteria 
should be employed: vision, strategy, accountability, implementation, risk management, growth, profitability, 
innovation, sustainability or transparency? 
 
A UK study by the Institute of Directors in association with Cass Business School (2015) involved six months 
of research into the measurement of corporate governance in UK listed companies using both perceptions 
and quantifiable instrumental factors. The investigating team concluded that: “no one approach can yet be 
used to measure corporate governance. We believe that corporate governance cannot be assessed using 
straightforward tick-box approaches, such as measuring how a company scores against an arbitrary list of 
factors”. 
 
One can raise questions about the contribution of corporate governance to all companies, and not just 
entrepreneurial ones. Is it more relevant to some board functions than others? Are dilemmas faced by 
directors and boards now easier to handle? Does it favour the interests of some stakeholder groups over 
others? Are particular board activities from visioning and delegating to implementing strategy and reporting 
noticeably better or worse? Could any beneficial changes be explained by factors other than corporate 
governance? Where does it rank in terms of impact, compared with say director and board development or 
bringing new blood into the boardroom and changing the composition of the board as a company grows and 
develops (Coulson-Thomas, 2007a)? 
 
PREVENTATIVE OR POSITIVE GOVERNANCE    
 
 
Many entrepreneurs recognise that governance arrangements should reflect how people are rather than how 
we would like them to be. Arrangements and policies may be required to address risks such as hacking, 
money laundering, terrorism, the funding of banned and suspect organisations and the stealing of personal 
and corporate information and intellectual property. A proportion of people may be out to take advantage of 
any loophole or opportunity, but surveillance, monitoring and counter-fraud initiatives can raise legal, moral 
and practical issues. They can also compromise trust.  
 
Could governance entrepreneurs, investigators and regulators use the expertise of the governance 
community more pro-actively and creatively and to better effect? For example, what about the governance of 
criminal and/or terrorist organisations? If we better understood the governance of these networks, how 
leadership is exercised within and across them, and how control is maintained, maybe we could find new 
ways of disrupting, disabling and/or neutralising them. 
Are boards ticking boxes to get governance out of the way in order to focus on business building, or are they 
investing quality time and effort in reviewing governance arrangements and investing in re-shaping them to 
contribute to the next phase of business development? If directors are doing just enough to show willing, 
how do we move on from compliance with general codes, rules and regulations to getting corporate 
governance arrangements right for particular enterprises?  
 
DISAGGREGATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Do we need to simplify and go back to basic principles of corporate governance (ACCA, 2014; ICAEW, 
2013) and add whatever elaboration is required for particular situations and contexts? One alternative to a 
single standard would be a series of codes and/or guidelines to address the distinct requirements of different 
types of entity and/or sectors, or organisations facing particular challenges and opportunities. Each would 
need to be periodically reviewed and updated to remain current, but who would do this and under what 
auspices? Would a family of codes, while it may have advantages, be a staging point en route to boards 
putting in place governance arrangements appropriate for the entities for which they are responsible? Should 
this be a statutory duty, with the lazy adoption of a standard model a possible indicator that directors are not 
doing their jobs? 
 
Is separate guidance required for governance in specific arenas such as innovation, knowledge, risk or talent 
management, IT or strategic planning? Potential adopters would need to ensure general guidance is 
appropriate for their particular companies. In some sectors intelligent steering rather than annual corporate 
planning may be required. Guidance relating to education and training and human capital growth might not 
be a priority for a company with a strategy of replacing people with robots, drones and self-help systems, but 
other considerations would need addressing (Ford, 2015). 
 
Governance is preoccupied with preventing downsides. The need for vigilance is justified by reference to 
corporate scandals, with the same few names regularly trotted out in articles and speeches. However, what 
about upside potential? For every negative example, there may well be hundreds or thousands of boards 
that are missing opportunities, taking well meaning but less than optimum decisions, and/or not operating as 
effectively as they could for a variety of reasons. What is governance contributing to this wider problem of 
improving the competence of directors and boards that could not be accomplished by other means such as 
director and board development? 
 
CHALLENGING GOVERNANCE ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
One might expect shareholders to be vigilant in looking after their best interests. This is particularly true of 
entrepreneurs and the worlds of SMEs and family companies, where shareholders often keep a close watch 
on their investments, or are intimately involved in 'building the business'. Many corporate governance 
approaches and codes have evolved to address a different situation, namely a separation of ownership and 
control and the reality that many investors have a diversified portfolio of investments and/or invest via 
institutions and their pensions (Mallin, 2014). Hence they have less motivation to be actively involved in the 
affairs of any particular company. 
 
Few if any individual shareholders can exert much influence on the affairs of many quoted companies of 
national and international significance. But the question of the relative advantage of standard and bespoke 
approaches still applies. The ideal governance requirements of an integrated utility considering a new 
generation of nuclear power stations may not be the same as that of a seasonal fashion business, or a 
restaurant chain or an e-business in terms of board composition, frequency of meetings, agendas or how the 
business of the board is conducted. Why do those whose governance experience derives from some arenas 
assume it is relevant in quite different contexts? 
 
Certain assumptions and widespread practices need to be challenged. For example, why do so many boards 
put such a high priority upon recruiting a high powered CEO? Elevating one person far above executive 
colleagues in standing and powers can encourage an unhealthy concentration of power and the hierarchical 
forms of organisation that are associated with it. Does current corporate governance assume certain forms of 
organisation? Is it equally relevant to the internet age and the different models of operation that are emerging 
and which can quickly mutate and enable entrepreneurs and relatively small numbers of people to rapidly 
build valuable businesses? 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY  
 
 
What is contemporary corporate governance contributing to sustainability? Governance and sustainability 
ought to be natural complements as continuity, effective challenge, the efficient use of resources and the 
best long-term interests of organisations and their stakeholders are concerns of practitioners in both arenas. 
Are they engaged in a productive dialogue? If solutions to sustainability and environmental issues require 
entrepreneurial responses then governance might best contribute by being conducive of enterprise and 
entrepreneurship.  
 
It is easy to become lost in the rhetoric of governance. What do terms such as 'transparency', 'integrity' and 
'ethical' mean in relation to sustainability? How open should one be in competitive markets about risks and 
future problems, while not being alarmist and while awaiting related developments? What are boards doing 
in terms of entrepreneurial responses to address and capitalise upon greater public interest in sustainability 
issues? Are people with sustainability credentials being brought onto boards? How does one assess whether 
or not individual directors and a board collectively are environmentally aware and alert to sustainability 
concerns? 
 
Mobile devices and social media mean can quickly spread awareness of corporate failure in sustainability 
and other areas to greater numbers of people than ever before. Some responses cannot wait until the next 
board meeting. Directors and boards face a host of new and emerging challenges and opportunities, a 
proportion of which may raise issues relating to direction, policy and/or strategy. In order to cope, directors 
may need to review governance arrangements and operate in new ways. These and other challenges 
represent opportunities for alert entrepreneurs. 
 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 
How are contemporary approaches to governance perceived in different parts of the world? Do views vary in 
respect of different types of entity at particular stages of growth and development? If the origins of corporate 
governance lay in a perceived requirement for greater shareholder power and democracy in the US (Ocasio 
and Joseph, 2005), how applicable are good governance principles to SMEs and entrepreneurial and family 
businesses in North America and elsewhere? 
 
Is consolidation or fragmentation occurring at an international level? Will the next generation of governance 
codes, regulations, approaches and guidelines contain more common elements, or will they be noticeably 
different in order to accommodate local issues and requirements? Will providers of finance and certain 
international institutions prefer some approaches over others? Will the corporate governance landscape 
favour or inhibit joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions? 
 
Are distinct areas of national or regional focus emerging? Do we need different approaches in an  Asian 
context or emerging regions of the world (Mishra, 2013)?  Could or will China seek to exert influence and 
promote a particular approach to governance? Are competing models and approaches converging or moving 
further apart? Which of any contending approaches are most conducive of enterprise and entrepreneurship? 
Should we be thinking in terms of 'global' best practices, and if so what are they and how does one judge 
their applicability in a particular situation and context? 
 
BUILDING MORE ENTREPRENEURIAL BOARDS 
 
 
How should boards renew and reshape themselves for tomorrow's pressures, priorities, concerns, 
challenges and opportunities? Is there an ideal board composition for driving business development and 
sustainable growth, or does it all depend upon the context? What constitutes a high performance board? 
How do directors and board chairs create a high performance board and best leverage and apply its 
contribution? Where speed and flexibility are important, there are quicker, cheaper and less disruptive routes 
to high performance organisations (Coulson-Thomas, 2012a and b, 2013). 
 
What are the priorities in respect of diversity, whether of thinking or board composition? How should one best 
improve diversity, relevance and quality? A collection of carefully chosen and excellent people does not 
necessarily constitute an effective board. How does one persuade a founder chairman and chief executive to 
separate a focus upon building the business from a focus upon the more effective operation of the board? 
What role should institutional investors and other owners and executive and independent directors play in 
building more effective boardroom teams? 
 
How should one set about building entrepreneurial boards in emerging markets (Mishra, 2013)? Are certain 
roles different from their equivalents in developed contexts? Do control structures need to be different and 
contextual? How should independent directors be selected, used and supported? In respect of family 
companies, what parallel developments need to occur in relation to the governance of family interests? How 
should one handle the departure of first generation entrepreneurs?  
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 
How should roles and responsibilities for building mutually beneficial relationships with different groups of 
stakeholders be allocated within an entrepreneurial team? Are there better ways of engaging stakeholders 
and involving them, whether to increase awareness of innovations and other developments and/or 
understanding, or to stimulate supportive action and benefit from it? 
 
What role should the company secretary play in an entrepreneurial context? How can those with financial, 
legal, risk, knowledge, talent and technology responsibilities better support entrepreneurs? How might 
colleagues with a professional interest in good governance share views, discuss issues and coordinate their 
responses? What can they contribute individually and collectively to ethical business practices and 
organisational integrity? 
 
As an entrepreneurial business grows and more people are recruited upward communication and informing, 
supporting and reporting to the board must not ossify. Whether by better understanding the function of the 
board and the distinct liabilities, duties and responsibilities of company directors or through better reporting 
mutual appreciation and support may need to increase, if the requirement for control of a more complex 
entity is to be balanced with the need for continuing innovation, new operating models and the expansion of 
a business into new products, services and markets.  
 
SUSTAINABLE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
In entrepreneurial contexts, the sustainability of an enterprise can involve innovation, discontinuity and what 
Joseph Schumpeter (1975/1942) termed “creative destruction”. More sustainable operations and practices 
can require the breakthroughs that creative entrepreneurs can bring about. The desire, intention and rhetoric 
of sustainability needs to be matched with practical initiatives to change behaviours in desired ways without 
putting a company at a competitive disadvantage. Sustainability concerns create new business opportunities. 
A more sustainable business model can also attract certain stakeholders. There are cost effective ways of 
helping staff, customers and users of goods and services to make more sustainable decisions (Coulson-
Thomas, 2012a and 2013)?  
 
Where there are calls from politicians, commentators, social and traditional media, and others for growth and 
development that is inclusive as well as sustainable, how should boards respond? While meeting legal 
obligations, should they skew business decisions to favour particular groups, or to achieve social objectives 
that might not be priorities for other stakeholders? Does being responsible extend to social engineering, 
supporting Government policies and becoming involved in areas that are properly the province of 
Government? While a Government might be very concerned with finding jobs for unemployed people, an 
entrepreneur seeking to be competitive and at the cutting edge might adopt competitive strategies that 
reduce employment (Ford, 2015; Kaplan, 2015).  
 
Boards have to make choices. In relation to sustainability, what are 'green credentials'? How important are 
they to customers and other stakeholders? How should one assess their achievement? How is a company 
portrayed and perceived in social media, and how representative are the views that others are expressing? 
In relation to timing, should directors act now or later, for example when the cost of renewable energy has 
further reduced? At what point has one done enough? 
 
VALUES, CSR AND THE BOARDROOM 
 
 
Directors and boards are custodians of an organisation's values. The board of a growing business might 
have to establish policies and principles to cover the activities of people from a range of nationalities, 
religions and political persuasions, some of whom may have very different values. Certain choices may be 
more difficult than they appear at first sight. Some directors find it easier to make ethical judgements than 
others. Should entrepreneurs embed CSR into corporate boardrooms or should they be sceptical? Where 
markets are free and regulation is effective, does irresponsible conduct simply lead to customers, investors 
and ones best employees going elsewhere?  
 
Might external factors such as CSR legislation lead some directors to loose sight of the primary purpose of 
enterprise? Might certain boards contribute more to wider society, as well as immediate stakeholders, by 
avoiding distraction with peripheral CSR initiatives, and focussing upon innovation and more effective and 
sustainable operation in their core business, where their comparative advantage is greatest and corporate 
capabilities are most relevant (Friedman, 1962)? Maybe entrepreneurs are being most responsible when 
they concentrate upon innovation and differentiation and giving customers new options and better, healthier 
and more sustainable choices. 
 
Are we in danger of imposing so many duties and expectations upon directors that some of them might loose 
the plot? In discussions of corporate values and ethics, what is the value of diverting attention and resources 
from a core activity where breakthroughs could be game changing to an initiative that may be inefficient in 
comparison but which is undertaken just to tick a CSR box and chalk up a 'responsibility' credential? In terms 
of their small scale, relative ineffectiveness and opportunity costs, is the use of corporate resources for some 
'social' initiatives ethical or unethical? 
 
MEASURING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
Some boards are blessed with favourable conditions that are not of their own making, while others are hit by 
a succession of problems. Coping with recession presents different challenges from riding a boom, but in 
tough economic times there may still be opportunities to gain competitive advantage. The assessment of 
board effectiveness should reflect the situation and circumstances. Should it take account of professionalism 
as well as performance, or the extent of entrepreneurial ambition? 
 
What are the emerging trends in relation to reporting, the accountability of directors and boards, how they 
are evaluated and how their individual and collective performance is measured? How should one assess 
performance and compliance? Are the approaches of internal and external auditors changing? How flexible 
are they in accommodating different situations and contexts? How can boards best work with them to obtain 
the assurance that directors require? How might risk-based and risk-centric approaches help? Can they 
accommodate different entrepreneurial styles? 
 
Entrepreneurs tend to watch costs. How many people read and understand annual reports and accounts? 
How could their value and cost-effectiveness be increased? Is integrated accounting a natural evolution or a 
paradigm shift? What are the implications of integrated accounting and/or international reporting standards 
for boards, stakeholders, governance and sustainability? What standards should family companies observe? 
Would confidence accounting clarify or complicate? How can rapidly growing businesses meet increasing 
reporting requirements while at the same time ensuring that stakeholders are not 'left behind' when situations 
and circumstances rapidly change? 
 
EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION IN GOVERNANCE  
 
 
Corporate governance has been in the spotlight long enough to have a history (Cheffins, 2013), but what of 
its future? Do we need a revolution in governance, a new model, a family of different approaches for various 
situations, or is it just a question of a shift of emphasis and change of balance? Does the notion of 
shareholder and owner now need to explicitly embrace entrepreneurs? 
 
Extensive frameworks of laws, regulations, checks, assurance and compliance mechanisms and large 
numbers of  people from auditors and independent directors to regulators, officials and those concerned with 
policing and fraud prevention are paid to check up on others and monitor them. If processes and systems 
are robust and scalable and transgressors are few in number, should more effort be devoted to appointing 
honest and competent people to boards? Would this be more cost-effective than imposing constraints upon 
all companies that might inhibit innovation and diversity? 
 
Wise backers of ventures and smart individuals looking to join them have always looked for honest, 
competent and fair-minded people who would look after their interests and do the right thing, in either 
favourable circumstances or adversity. They would weigh the risks involved, welcome any windfalls and 
suffer any occasional losses. Only the naïve and greedy would normally expect other than reasonable 
returns over time. Since the creation of limited liability companies, their owners, whether holders of shares in 
a quoted company or in a family business, have hoped that directors will be competent and boards effective 
and adding value rather than just acting as rubber stamps.  
 
Boards can benefit entrepreneurial enterprises (Coulson-Thomas, 2007a and b). Many entrepreneurs would 
gain from directors of integrity with a passion for growing businesses and who can think for themselves and 
are able to put the interests of others before their own. They should look for people who view a directorial 
appointment as an opportunity to make a difference, and who commit to lifetime learning from their 
experiences and that of others in order to stay current, become a better director, and match the changing 
needs of a developing business. The corporate governance community should reflect upon how their 
experience might be drawn upon and how their practices might be amended to help this process and better 
support enterprise and entrepreneurship.  
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